Despite the considerable level of detail in its initial 2003 proposal, the CCA has been in almost continual evolution since its inception.
In this paper, we review a few of the most important changes that have already occurred.
Then, we propose and discuss three additional enhancements.
I. Early Evolution of the CCA
This section reviews a few of the most important evolutionary changes to the CCA.
A. Opportunity Cost Pricing
Ever since the CCA was proposed, the intention has been that the prices ultimately charged to bidders would reflect opportunity costs. Roughly speaking, the notion of opportunity cost has been formalized by the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism.
However, if bidders' preferences do not satisfy the substitutes property, the VCG mechanism may produce "uncompetitive" prices (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002) . For this reason, the initial proposal for the CCA, as well as all implementations to date, employed variants on the VCG mechanism that generate core payoffs (relative to the submitted bids).
The initial proposal for the CCA incorporated the "ascending proxy auction" (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002, and Parkes, 2001 ) for pricing.
However, the pricing mechanism had evolved by the time that the CCA was implemented. of the bidder-optimal frontier of the core (Day and Raghavan, 2007, and Day and Milgrom, 2008) . Mechanisms selecting outcomes from this frontier are referred to as "core-selecting mechanisms". When the VCG outcome lies in the core, the bidder-optimal frontier is a single point; but, otherwise, this frontier includes a continuum of points (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002) . Day and Cramton suggested focusing on the bidder-optimal core point that minimizes the Euclidean distance from VCG payoffs, a criterion which yields a unique solution (Day and Cramton, 2012). The There are two reasons for the change. First, the specific form of the ascending proxy auction is essentially a static representation of the outcome of a dynamic process in which proxy agents bid on behalf of the bidders, and it is not especially conducive to computation. Second, if bidders do not have substitutes preferences, the outcome of the ascending proxy auction does not necessarily lie on the frontier of the core, i.e., it may provide a core "adjustment" that is unnecessarily large. In practice, nearest-Vickrey pricing or a weighted version of this mechanism has been used in all CCA implementations to date.
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This environment is sometimes referred to as the LLG model: two items, two "local" bidders who each desire one of the items, and one "global" bidder who values both items as perfect complements.
4 Erdil and Klemperer (2010) argue that a class of payment rules called "reference rules" may provide superior incentives to the nearest-Vickrey mechanism in the LLG model. Ausubel and Baranov (2013) exhibit closed-form equilibria of both the ascending proxy auction and the nearest-Vickrey mechanism, for a parameterized family of LLG models, and show that for a range of parameters, the ascending proxy auction dominates in both efficiency and revenues. 5 One reason for employing weights is that, in auctions with regional licenses, the winning bidders might receive disparate winnings. Day and Cramton had motivated their formulation, in part, by the fairness of bidders sharing the core "burden" equally. However, with disparate winnings, equal sharing might be unfair to bidders with smaller winnings. In this light, the Australian and Canadian CCAs have used a weighted nearest-Vickrey mechanism in which the bidder-optimal core point P = (p1 , … , pN) is selected which minimizes (P -V)
T W(P -V), where V=(v1 , … , vN) denotes the VCG payoffs of the N bidders and W is a weight matrix that is based on the reserve prices of the corresponding winning packages. However, under the bounds only approach, bidders might be able to acquire marginal items at very low incremental cost (sometimes zero). This violates one of the general rationales for a reserve price in a public auction: the reserve price should reflect the societal opportunity cost of selling the item today rather than saving it for some time later.
Moreover, bidders in some scenarios may find it optimal to bid above their values for some items, knowing that they have unspent "reserve capacity" which will absorb the cost. This is not possible under a reserve bidders approach.
Consequently, some of the more recent
CCAs, including those in Australia and
Canada, have adopted the reserve bidders approach. In addition, the UK switched course from the bounds only to the reserve bidders approach for its 2013 digital dividend auction.
C. Assignment Stage
In a traditional spectrum auction, if six nearidentical frequency blocks were offered, the seller would ask bidders to submit bids on the specific licenses A to F. A more economical approach is for bidders simply to indicate the quantity of blocks they would like to purchase during the main part of the auction. Only after the winning quantities have been determined do bidders need to submit bids for specific frequencies. This approach both speeds the progress of the auction and reduces the complexity of bidding.
The main insights in the introduction of the CCA's assignment stage were: (1) it is preferable to replace any administrative decisions about the assignment of specific licenses with a bidding process, for all the same reasons that it is preferable to determine winners via an auction; but (2) bidding options should be limited only to assignments that would be considered as the outcome of an administrative decision. For example, an equivalent quantity of spectrum is considered to be more valuable when it is contiguous, while assigning spectrum in a checkerboard configuration results in economic waste.
Consequently, the only assignments that are considered are those in which all winners are assigned contiguous spectrum within a region, and the only frequency options on which bidding is permitted are those that are consistent with such contiguous outcomes.
The first auction in which assignments were determined through an assignment round and limited in this way was the 2005 Trinidad and Tobago Spectrum Auction. Essentially all CCAs to date have adopted this approach.
II. Future Evolution of the CCA
This section proposes and discusses three evolutionary enhancements for future CCAs.
A. Bidding Language
One of the critical elements of the CCA design is the explicit use of package bids. The initial CCA proposal used a bidding language under which all bids are treated as mutually exclusive ("XOR bids"). The XOR bidding language is understood to be a fully expressive 6 but non-compact 7 language.
Until recently, the compactness issue was never a practical concern in the CCA context, A bidding language is said to be fully expressive if it can be used to communicate any valuation profile. 7
In auctions with many items, bidders might need to submit an astronomical number of XOR bids to express simple preferences that can be expressed using just a handful of bids in a more compact bidding language. In conjunction with the compact bidding language, it is important to provide bidders with various controls over their submitted OR bids. For example, a bidder can be allowed to specify a total size limit or a total budget limit for its collection of OR bids that will be considered. The ability of a bidder to indicate that certain OR components are mutually exclusive is also important.
The integration of OR bids into the CCA is not completely straightforward. One (perhaps the biggest) challenge is to design an appropriate activity rule for OR bids. Typical CCA activity rules are formulated in terms of whole packages, and are not trivially extended to handle OR components.
9 This issue creates a strong need for well-defined and robust activity rules that can be consistently applied both to XOR and OR bids. One such activity rule is introduced in the next subsection.
B. Revealed-Preference Activity Rule
The most fundamental innovation of the SMRA, when it was introduced for spectrum auctions 20 years ago, was the imposition of activity rules on bidders. Activity rules are intended to prevent "bid sniping": the phenomenon widely observed in auctions such as eBay where bidders conceal their true intentions until the very end of the auction.
Bid sniping effectively converts a dynamic auction into a sealed-bid auction and thereby defeats the purpose of a dynamic auction.
The standard implementation of activity rules in SMRAs uses "points". The auctioneer assigns a number of points to each item in the auction, most commonly based on the population of a license region or some other measure of value. 10 The activity rule is then some variant on a requirement that the 9 Given the potentially vast number of values communicated through OR bids, a sensible approach would be to move activity rule validation from the bid entry process to the winner determination process; bids for individual OR components are entered subject to the usual activity rules, but bids for combinations of OR bids are automatically capped by the solver. 10 For example, a New York license might be assigned 100 points and a Washington DC license might be assigned 25 points.
bidder's total points bid must be nonincreasing as the auction progresses; thus, it requires bidders to submit bids in early rounds of the auction in order to retain the right to submit bids for an equivalent quantity (as measured by points) in later rounds.
Point-based activity rules are too weak, in that they create a number of opportunities for strategic bidding. Most notoriously, points give rise to "parking": placing bids on items that one is not interested in buying, for the purpose of stockpiling points for future use.
Less appreciated is the fact that point-based activity rules are, in other ways, too strong. The GARP-based activity rule is the requirement that, given a price and bid history (p 1 , x 1 ), … , (p t-1 , x t-1 ), the bidder is permitted to bid x t in round t if and only if the data (p 1 , x 1 ), … , (p t , x t ) is consistent with GARP. Ausubel and Baranov (2014) prove the following about the GARP-based activity rule:
 It is the strictest activity rule consistent with straightforward bidding (in the sense that the bidder is always allowed to bid for any of its optimal packages). 
C. Iterative Pricing
Most dynamic auction formats, both in the literature and in real-world applications, could be characterized as "iterative first-price" auctions. Consider, for example, the English auction for a single item. While it is often modeled as a sealed-bid second-price auction, bidders submit bids which, if they turn out to win, specify the actual amounts that will be paid. While effectively a second-price auction, it is literally an iterative first-price auction. 
III. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed three enhancements for future CCAs. Introducing an OR bidding language in the supplementary round would be the most incremental change.
In January 2014, the Canadian Government announced that it will adopt this enhancement in its upcoming 2500 MHz auction. The need is quite clear, as with 318 licenses, grouped into 106 categories, this will be the largest CCA in scale to date.
A GARP-based activity rule is also a modest evolutionary step, as revealedpreference considerations have already been employed. Transforming the CCA from an iterative second price to an iterative first price auction, would be the largest step.
Current activity rules may lead to exposure calculations that equal or exceed the final clock prices, while GARP-based activity rules yield exposures more in line with opportunitycost-based prices. Thus, the new activity rule is not only a compelling evolutionary change on its own, but it also facilitates the evolution of the CCA to an iterative first-price auction.
